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CENTRIST JUDGING AND TRADITIONAL FAMILY





Many important cases involving the state's regulation of family rela-
tionships were decided during Justice Lewis Powell's tenure on the United
States Supreme Court. Justice Powell played a pivotal role in much of this
jurisprudence on the family, often serving as the reasoned voice of tradi-
tional family values in a rapidly changing society. In this sense, he could
be called the consummate centrist. This article will consider how Justice
Powell used his centrist constitutional analysis to balance traditional values,
the rights of individuals to form traditional and nontraditional family
relationships, and the proper role of the state in family matters. Although
the general focus will be on constitutional jurisprudence involving family
relationships and responsibilities, specific attention will be placed on the
roles and responsibilities of fathers.
I. Tir SHAPE AND STrLE OF CENTRIST JUDGING
The theme of centrist judging conjures up images of geometric forms
and mechanical principles. One sees a circle with a radial arm of justice
rooted at a given center point sweeping out to touch all the relevant and
sometimes competing interests in a given case. The circumference can be
lengthened or shortened as the needs of justice demand. Or imagine an
equilateral triangle constructed with sides which represent the autonomy
and rights of the individual, the proper authority of the state, and the basic
tenets of the Constitution. The three-sided simplicity gives fundamental
strength to constitutional analysis and interpretation.
Consider further the physical principles of leverage; perhaps best illus-
trated by the see-saw of our childhood playgrounds. We attempted to
balance the lever of the see-saw against a set point or fulcrum. If the weight
on one side is too heavy, we can either add more weight to the lighter side
or shift the board on the fulcrum so that the heavy side is shorter in length.
Accordingly, a centrist judge would have the flexibility to shift the weights
of values and principles to achieve a balance of constitutional imperatives.
These images resonate in many of Justice Lewis Powell's opinions
concerning family and family relationships. In Zablocki v. Redhail, the
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
** Washington and Lee University School of Law, Class of 1993.
1. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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Court considered the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute prohibiting
entering into a second marriage if the party has continuing, unmet financial
obligations in a previous marriage. 2 While Powell concurred that the statute
was unconstitutional, he wrote a separate opinion explaining why the
majority went too far:
I write separately because the majority's rationale sweeps too broadly
in an area which traditionally has been subject to pervasive state
regulation. The Court apparently would subject all state regulation
which "directly and substantially" interferes with the decision to
marry in a traditional family setting to "critical examination" or
"compelling state interest" analysis .... Since state regulation in
this area typically takes the form of a prerequisite or barrier to
marriage or divorce, the degree of "direct" interference with the
decision to marry or to divorce i§ unlikely to provide either guidance
for state legislatures or a basis for judicial oversight.3
In other words, the Court has drawn the circle too broadly making it
difficult for the state to perform its traditional function of regulating
marriage.
4
The equilateral triangle model is aptly illustrated by the Mathews v.
Eldridge' case involving a consideration of the procedures used in an
administrative hearing to terminate Social Security disability benefits. The
following three part test announced by Powell and used often in cases
involving family matters, helps identify and measure the competing concerns
in constitutional analysis:
... our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
6
During Powell's tenure on the Court, the three factors articulated in
Mathews v. Eldridge were used in several significant cases involving family
matters. In Little v. Streater,7 an alleged father in a state-sponsored paternity
2. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375-76 (1978).
3. Id. at 396-97.
4. See id. at 398 (differentiating Loving v. Virginia because that case dealt with complete
denial of fundamental right because of race rather than traditional state regulation of marriage
and divorce).
5. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
6. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
7. 452 U.S. 1 (1980).
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suit unsuccessfully requested that the state pay for a blood grouping test.8
The Court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Burger, found a
violation of his Due Process rights using the Mathews v. Eldridge factors.
It held:
Assessment of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors indicates that ap-
pellant did not receive the process he was constitutionally due.
Without aid in obtaining blood test evidence in a paternity case, an
indigent defendant, who faces the State as an adversary when the
child is a recipient of public assistance and who must overcome the
evidentiary burden Connecticut imposes, lacks "a meaningful op-
portunity to be heard." 9
The Court used the same analysis in cases concerning the termination
of parental rights. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,0 the Court
found that the Due Process Clause did not necessarily require the appoint-
ment of counsel for an indigent mother in a parental termination case." In
Santosky v. Kramer,'2 the Court considered what standard of proof was
constitutionally required in parental termination hearings. Justice Blackmun
found that "the three Eldridge factors compel the conclusion that the use
of a 'fair preponderance of the evidence' standard in such proceedings is
inconsistent with due process.' ' 3 His opinion, joined by Justice Powell,
went on to hold that "before a State may sever completely and irrevocably
the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the
State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.
' ' 4
Clearly, Justice Powell's Mathews v. Eldridge opinion stands as a significant
landmark in the constitutional analysis of family law issues.
Consider further how Powell carefully weighs competing family values
when examining children's constitutional rights. Powell recognizes that while
the Constitution is for everyone, children should not be treated equally
8. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 3 (1980).
9. Id. at 16 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971)).
10. 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
11. Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981). Using the three part
analysis the Court concluded as follows:
To summarize the above discussion of the Eldridge factors: the parent's
interest is an extremely important one (and may be supplemented by the
dangers of criminal liability inherent in some termination proceedings); the
State shares with the parent an interest in a correct decision, has a relatively
weak pecuniary interest, and, in some but not all cases, has a possibly stronger
interest in informal procedures; and the complexity of the proceeding and the
incapacity of the uncounseled parent could be, but would not always be great
enough to make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parent's rights
insupportably high.
Id.
12. 455 U.S. 755 (1982).
13. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 755, 758 (1982).
14. Id. at 747-48. See id. at 768-70 (justifying clear and convincing evidentiary standard).
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under the law in certain instances because they are in need of parental
guidance.'" In Bellotti v. Baird,6 Powell writes that "legal restrictions on
minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important
to the child's chances for full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.' ' 7 Powell qualifies
his approach to legal restorations by stating that abortion must be dealt
with cautiously: if a minor girl proves that she is sufficiently mature to
make this decision, she should be treated as an adult and be allowed to
make the decision. 8
Powell differs from the opinion of other Justices in that he believes
children should not have the same legal rights as adults. In Carey v.
Population Services International,9 the Court considered a law pertaining
to the distribution of contraceptives to persons under sixteen. 20 The statute
was held unconstitutional because it interfered with the fundamental liberty
right of procreation. 2' They should also have the individual right to choose
the "adult" option of procreation. 22 Powell concurred in the decision, but
felt these women should not have been given "adult" standing because the
State justly has a stronger interest in regulating activities of minors and
protecting children. 23 This statute is overbroad because married women
between fourteen and sixteen should have this right,24 however, other minors
should not have this much discretion so soon.21 The family unit should be
protected.26 If a parent wants to distribute contraceptives, fine, but some
parental guidance is necessary to keep the family unit and society's values
in place.27
Similarly, in H.L. v. Matheson,21 Powell concurs that a Utah statute
which requires all physicians, if possible, to contact dependent unmarried
15. See infra notes 16-32 (discussing need for parent's roles in their children's decision
making process).
16. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
17. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639-40 (1979). "We have recognized three reasons
justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those
of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing." Id. at
634.
18. Id. at 643-44.
19. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
20. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 683 (1977).
21. Id. at 693.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 709. "Requiring minors to seek parental guidance would be consistent with
our prior cases." Id.
24. Id. at 707.
25. Id. at 709. Powell states, "[Slociety has long adhered to the view that sexual
intercourse should not be engaged in promiscuously, a judgement that an adolescent may be
less likely to heed than an adult." Id.
26. Id. at 708.
27. Id.
28. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
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girls' parents prior to abortion is unconstitutional. 29 However, he states that
while parents of the girls the Court deems mature enough to make their
own decisions do not require parental notification, parental consent is a
good idea for minors in general. 0 Because parents have a traditional and
substantial interest in the welfare of their children, especially during im-
mature years,'notifying them of an abortion, a possible traumatic experience
for their daughters, is constitutional. 31 Powell believes that a statute pro-
viding some parental guidance in this area would be constitutional and
desirable. Wherever birth control and abortion are concerned, Powell be-
lieves that the family should have some knowledge of the children's actions
since parents have a traditional and substantial interest in the welfare of
their children.3 2
II. SEARCHING FOR TRADToNAL VALuEs AND PRINCIPLES
Two major themes run through Justice Powell's opinions: the impor-
tance of the "traditional" family structure in society and the importance
of individual liberty as it applies to traditional legal principles.
A. Traditional Values of the Family
First, Powell places great emphasis on the importance of the family
unit in American history. In Moore v. East Cleveland," Powell held that
extended families have the fundamental right to share the same dwelling.
3 4
"Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate
and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.
' 35
In Bellotti v. Baird, Powell speaks of the traditional values of the
family unit and parenting as follows:
While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this subject, we
cannot ignore that central to many of these theories, and deeply
rooted in our Nation's history and tradition, is the belief that the
parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's
children. Indeed, "constitutional interpretation has consistently rec-
ognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household
to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of
our society."
'3 6
The family is also the place where children are traditionally supported
and cared for by parents regardless of the parents marital status. Basic
traditional needs, such as food, shelter, clothing and health care are met
29. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 419.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 419-20.
33. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
34. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).
35. Id.
36. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (citation omitted).
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within the family unit. Accordingly, the State has created programs to assist
with the fulfillment of family support and care obligations. Justice Powell
would protect the right to participate in these programs as long as the
claimants were involved in a familial relationship dedicated to fulfilling the
traditional family functions of care and support.
For example, in United Stctes v. Clark,37 the Court considered whether
a deceased federal employee's illegitimate children qualified for survivors
benefits under the Civil Service Retirement Act. At issue was the statutory
meaning of a provision that "children born out of wedlock [qualified for
survivors' benefits] only if they 'lived with the employee ... in a regular
parent-child relationship."' 38 The critical question was whether the children
were actually dependent for their care on the employee as demonstrated by
actually living with the employee at the time of his death or merely had
lived with the deceased at some time.39 The Court found that Congress did
not intend to create a dependency requirement for children born out of
wedlock.4° To do so would be a violation of equal protection principles .4
Justice Marshall writing for the Court held "we conclude that the "lived
with" requirement is satisfied when a recognized natural child has lived
with the deceased employee in a "regular parent-child relationship," re-
gardless of whether the child was living with the employee at the time of
the employee's death."
' 42
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell agreed that the children qualified
for the benefits, but stated the Court had too broadly expanded the "lived
with" requirement. 43 He concluded that "Congress intended the 'lived with'
requirement to serve as a means through which illegitimate children may
prove actual dependency on the deceased parent." What impressed Justice
Powell in this case was that the father had lived together with the children
and their mother as a family. 45 The employee was the judicially determined
father of the children with support obligations and had "provided monthly
support payments up to the time of his death." In other words, the
employee had, on behalf of his children, earned the right to receive survivors'
benefits because he fulfilled his traditional duty of support and care.
In Serving Justice: A Supreme Court Clerk's View, 47 J. Harvie Wilkinson
III, quotes Powell's view on the value of the family:
37. 445 U.S. 23 (1980).
38. United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980).
39. Id. at 28-29.
40. Id. at 32.
41. Id. at 32-33.
42. Id. at 33.
43. United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 35 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 35.
45. Id. at 24, 35-36.
46. Id. at 24.
47. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, SERVING JUSTICE: A SUPREME COURT CLERK'S VIEW (1974).
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Today, we are being cut adrift from the type of humanizing
authority which in the past shaped the character of the people. I
am thinking, not of governmental authority, but rather the more
personal forms we have known in the home, church, school, and
community. These personal authorities once gave direction to our
lives. They were our reference points, the institutions and relation-
ships which molded our character. 41
One senses in Powell's opinions his belief in traditional family values
and responsibilities. The family unit must survive and be the locus, for
important decisions especially those concerning abortion and education as
they impact adolescents. 49 It must also be the place where support, care and
love are freely given.
B. The Traditional Values of the Constitution
The second theme which repeats through Powell's opinions is that
personal liberty often outweighs state law where "traditional" constitutional
issues are being decided. Personal liberty is especially important where the
private realm of family life is involved. 0 Powell often writes that where the
law has traditionally permitted freedom of choice, these freedoms should
continue to be respected. The Court should protect those fundamental
liberties which are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.
'51
The constitutionality of state abortion laws is an area where Justice
Powell has written several opinions which reflect his traditional jurispru-
dence. Where a statute attempts to unjustly limit the fundamental right to
abortion granted in Roe v. Wade,52 Powell consistently finds the statute
unconstitutional. 53 In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduction Health,
54
Powell found an abortion statute unconstitutional because it basically cut
off the right of indigent women to have abortions and increased health
risks. 55 It also limited the traditional doctor-patient rule of confidentiality.56
However, where the law has not expanded the rights of women to
abortion, Powell is unwilling to interpret the Constitution as extending
women's rights. For example, traditionally and legally the Social Security
48. Id. at 106-107 (quoting Lewis Powell SPEECH TO PRAYER BREAKFAST OF AMmuCAN
BAR ASSOCIATION (1972), reprinted in U.S. News & World Report 10-11 (Aug. 28, 1972).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 15-32.
50. Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurispru-
dence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L. REv. 1, 40 (1987); see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
642 (1979) (stating that abortion decisions by minors are unique and deserve particular sensitivity
by state legislatures).
51. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
52. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
53. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 426-27 (1983) (stating
that Roe had strong history of judicial support).
54. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
55. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 450 (1983).
56. Id. at 445.
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Act does not require states to fund nontherapeutic abortions.17 In Beal v.
Doe,5" Powell could find no legal history nor any precedent suggesting that
states must fund this type of abortion. 9 Because women never had this
privilege in the past, Powell wrote that it would be up to Congress to
expand the law, not the Supreme Court. 60 Powell claims that the sole
purpose of the court is to interpret laws, not to expand upon them.6 ' His
opinions lean towards conservatism and what he feels is part of the Amer-
ica's traditional past.
62
In Stump v. Sparkman,63 Powell dissents because he believes that Judge
Stump had no right to give a mother permission to have her partially
retarded daughter undergo tubal ligation surgery.64 Powell writes that there
is a complete absence of normal judicial process in Judge Stump's decision.6 s
Parents do not normally seek a judge's petition to have an operation such
as this performed on their child, and there is no Indiana precedent suggesting
judges ever acted in this capacity. Parents and judges have not traditionally
had this right over another capable individual." Therefore, the judge should
not be immune from prosecution for this decision. Immunity is often
justified because there are several other means of protecting individual
rights. Here no other methods exist so the decision violates the Equal
Protection Clause.67
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1992 & Supp. 11 1992).
58. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
59. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445 (1977).
60. Id. at 447.
61. Id.
62. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 476 (1977) (discussing prior decisions regarding
constitutionally protected liberty interests); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 581-82 (1975)
(discussing original purposes of statute). Powell concurs in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 197 (1986), that a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy is not unconstitutional because
it is not a traditional, fundamental right under the 14th Amendment. Compare Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979) (rejecting traditional gender differentiation between
mothers and fathers in dealing with their children) with Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-800
(1977) (accepting statutes that effectively excluded relationships between illegitimate children
and their natural fathers while allowing relationship with mothers).
63. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
64. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 369 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 370.
66. Id. at 365.
67. Id. at 370. Powell's unwillingness to go beyond the traditional bounds of the
Constitution is also evident in Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs., 458 U.S. 502
(1982), where he held that the "federal courts properly have been reluctant to extend the writ
of Habeas beyond its historical purpose." Id. at 512-13. In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 285-89
(1979), Powell dissents, finding that the majority has not given enough weight to the Article
III "case and controversy" problem which this case involves. In Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S.
'321, 329 (1983), Powell states, "no single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted
that local control over the operation of schools .... ." Local control has been thought to be
essential to the maintenance of community concern and quality of public education. Id. at
329. Therefore, the Texas statute is constitutional. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636, 642-53 (1975), where Powell held that Social Security is designed to help the family.
Therefore, both men and women wage earners who head households must be treated equally.
TRADITIONAL FAMILY VALUES
Wherever personal liberties rooted in the Constitution are involved,
Justice Powell sways towards individual freedom over government control.
Whether the topic is abortion, paternity, S6cial Security benefits or divorce,
traditional legal principles are key to Powell's decision-making process."s
III. POWELL AND T=E TRADITIONS OF FATHERHOOD
If Justice Powell is a centrist, then his sense of tradition is at the heart
of his jurisprudence. Tradition controls the radial sweep of the court's
actions. Tradition maintains the trilateral symmetry of rights, authority and
constitutionalism. Tradition is the fulcrum for the careful, judicious weigh-
ing of competing values and principles. !
A. Earning Fatherhood Rights
A proper demonstration of this can be seen in Justice Powell's explo-
ration of the traditional values of fatherhood. His tenure on the Court fell
between the cases of Stanley v. Illinois 9 and Michael H. v. Gerald D.70 He
took no part in the consideration of either of these cases. However, these
two cases symbolize an era in which the constitutional essence of fatherhood
was vigorously debated by the Supreme Court with Justice Powell playing
a major role.
Stanley was a watershed case because for the first time the Court
expressly recognized that in spite of the traditions of society, men can be
primary caretakers of their children. Emphasizing this, Justice White held
"it may be, as the State insists, that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable
and neglectful parents.... But all unmarried fathers are not in this cate-
gory; some are wholly suited to have custody of their children."
7'
The Court found that even though Peter Stanley was not married to
the mother of his children, he deserved the opportunity to prove that he
was a fit parent.72 This was especially true for Stanley because he had been
actively involved in the parenting of his children.7 3 In Michael H., Justice
Scalia seriously considered the proposition of a whether or not a child can
in fact have two DADS. Michael, the biological father who was also actively
involved in the care of his daughter, Victoria, was found to have no
cognizable constitutional rights to participate in the parenting of his child
because the mother was married to Gerald at the time of the child's birth. 74
68. See Kahn, supra note 50, at 46-47 (discussing influence of tradition on Powell's
adjudication).
69. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See infra notes 70-87 and accompanying text (discussing
fatherhood rights).
70. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
71. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654 (1972).
72. Id. at 658.
73. Id. at 654-55.
74. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989).
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The Court upheld the presumption that the husband and the mother of a
child born during a valid marriage are in fact and in law the parents of
that child.
75
Had Justice Powell still been on the Court, we are certain that he would
have provided the fifth vote needed to hold for Michael. Powell vigorously
argued that a man's right to participate in parenting is protected by the
Constitution. This is so even where proof of paternity is an issue as was
the situation in Trimble v. Gordon76, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co.7 7, Parham v. Hughes78, and Lalli v. LalIP9-cases where Justice Powell
filed an opinion. In those cases Powell asserted that the father should be
able to achieve the final act of caring for his children-the father had the
right to leave a financial legacy for his children's benefit.
However, balanced against this right is a system of deep values. The
extent of the constitutional protection is determined in large part by the
fulfillment of the traditional duties and obligations of fatherhood. Fathers
ought to have a "natural affinity" 80 for their children who should "be
nourished and loved."' 81 Fathers are further obligated to provide financial
support to any children they bring into the world. The support obligation
is not only a legal duty but also a moral duty derived from the traditional
mores of our society. 2 Powell reflected on this in Zablocki v. Redhail by
stating "the State, representing the collective expression of moral aspirations,
has an undeniable interest in ensuring that its rules of domestic relations
reflect the widely held values of its people." 83
This is why Powell filed a stirring dissent in Ridgeway v. Ridgeway.4
There a service man agreed in a divorce settlement to maintain a life
insurance policy with his children as beneficiaries.8" Upon remarriage, he
made his new wife the sole beneficiary, excluding his children. 86 The Court,
viewing this in part as a contracts case, held that the Servicemen's Group
Life Insurance Act permitted the father to freely change his beneficiary,
thereby preempting any state divorce law to the contrary. 87 Powell believed
that the insurance proceeds should have been held in trust for the benefit
of the children. In his dissent he said:
In my view, the Court is plainly wrong in concluding that Richard's
conduct was "nothing more than a breach of contract" and that
75. Id. at 127.
76. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
77. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
78. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
79. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
80. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 169 (1972).
81. Id. at 174.
82. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769-72 (1977).
83. 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978).
84. 454 U.S. 46, 49 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
85. Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 454 U.S. 46, 48 (1981).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 60.
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his obligation was like that of "any commercial" debtor who
defaults on a judgment. Familial obligations are not merely com-
mercial. Few legal duties are more universally acknowledged than
the duty of a father to support his children. This duty existed in
this case by law before the divorce. As a result of the divorce, it
was recognized explicitly by Richard's contract with his family and
by the divorce decree ordering him to discharge that duty by
maintaining the insurance at issue for the benefit of his children.
Yet, the Court today analogizes a father's support duty to that of
a commercial debtor! This holding ignores the difference not only
in character of the duties but also in their consequences. A defaulting
debtor ... may not be sent to jail. But a father who defaults on
his duty to support his children or who violates a court decree
enforcing that duty may be imprisoned for contempt.88
B. Caban v. Mohammed' 9-A Study in Centrist Judging
Perhaps the vintage case which illustrates Powell's centrist jurisprudence
is Caban v. Mohammed.9° The facts and circumstances of the family in this
case could stand as the metaphor for all the challenges that currently
confront American families. There was nonmarital cohabitation because
Abdiel Caban was still married to another while living with Maria Mo-
hammed. There was marriage and remarriage after separation and divorce
creating new blended families with step-parents and step-children. The couple
had a difficult custody battle after an apparent parental kidnapping of the
children. The extended family of both parties played significant roles as
temporary custodians or as grandparents with informal visitation privileges.
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived together without the benefit
of marriage for over five years. 9' During that time they produced two
children. After they separated, Maria married Kazim Mohammed. 92 Caban
continued to support his children and to be involved in their lives. 93 When
Kazim Mohammed attempted to adopt the two children, Caban could not
object because unwed fathers have limited rights under New York adoption
statutes. Caban claimed that he had been denied equal protection because
other parents can withhold consent to adoption. 94 He also had been denied
"the Due Process right of natural fathers to maintain a parental relationship
with their children absent a finding that they are unfit as parents." 95
88. Id. at 67-68.
89. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
90. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979).
91. Id. at 382.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 385.
95. Id.
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Justice Powell clearly understood the competing values and principles
and balanced them against the fulcrum of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
his traditionalist way, he equally measured the authority and concerns of
the state, the fatherhood rights of Caban and the wisdom of the constitu-
tional doctrine which requires due process before the deprivation of that
fatherhood right.
For him, the radial reach of the Court encompassed fathers like Caban
who demonstrate:
... that an unwed father may have a relationship with his children
fully comparable to that of the mother. Appellant Caban, appellee
Maria Mohammed, and their two children lived together as a natural
family for several years. As members of this family, both mother
and father participated in the care and support of their children.
There is no reason to believe that the Caban children-aged 4 and
6 at the time of the adoption proceedings-had a relationship with
their mother unrivaled by the affection and concern of their father. 6
Society cannot ask more of a man than that he, with love and affection,
take care of the children he produces. It is not only a constitutional right,
it is also a constitutional duty. Michael H., however, turns the Caban v.
Mohammed analysis on its head. The decision ignores both social and
biological fact to achieve a rigid, formalistic result which denies reality and
the fatherhood rights of Michael. Ironically, Victoria will always know who
her real Dad is even though the law ignores Michael H. Relationships of
love are not easily broken by judicial fiat. Ultimately, Victoria may be the
one who decides if she can have two loving dads.
CONCLUSION
The centrist judging style of Justice Powell has a proper place in a
society beset by rapid change. The fluidity of centrism accommodates a
broad vision of individual rights against the constant mooring of traditional
constitutional doctrine. His methods of constitutional balancing allow us to
preserve traditional family responsibilities and yet recognize the ever chang-
ing nature of familial relationships. Ultimately, Justice Powell's tenure on
the Court will be remembered for judicially articulating the values of
responsible fatherhood. Men received the constitutional privilege and duty
to be equal participants in raising the next generation.
96. Id. at 389.
